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FOREWORD
Industrialization has been an important element-of the
development strategies pursued by ASEAN member coun-
tries. In their desire to diversify and modernize their econo-
mies, they have actively implemented industrial promotion
policies of varying form, duration and degree. Not so very
long ago, the Philippines initiated a package of industrial
policy reforms intended to hasten the pace and pattern of
industrial development in the country.
To provide broader perspectivesand insights into the
formulation and implementation of industrial promotion
policies, this second publication under the PIDS Monograph
Series deals with industrial development in the ASEAN
member countries. Aptly written by Romeo M. Bautista,
it outlines the pattern of industrial development in each
ASEAN country, and emphasizes the evolution and role
of industrial promotion policies. The paper further analyzes
the Korean industrialization experience from which lessons
can be drawn and examines the potential areasfor industrial
complementarity and trade expansion between ASEAN and
thenewly industrializingcountries (NICs) of Asia.
It is hoped that readersof this Monograph will find it
both interestingand useful.
FILOLOGO PANTE, JR.
President
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INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ASEAN COUNTRIES*
Romeo M. Bautista
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic growth of the ASEAN countries in the last two decadeshas
been very impressive (see Table 1), especially considering the increased
instability of the world economy during the 1970s. The range of average
annual GNP growth rates of 6.2 percent to 8 percent for the region during
1970-79 compares favorably with any region elsewhere. Industrial growth
rates over the same period are evenhigher (8.4 percent-11.3 percent) so that
the contribution of industry to GDP has increasedsignificantly for each of
the ASEAN countries.
By wide agreement, the ASEAN economiesare in the next tier of devel-
oping countries more or lessfollowing the industrialgrowth path of the ad-
vanced developing countries - the so-called NICs (newly industrializing
countries). Indeed, the economically most advanced ASEAN member, Singa-
pore, is one of the Asian NICs, which also include Hongkong, Taiwan, and
South Korea (from hereon to be referred to simply as Korea). Becausethese
couhtries are also among the world's fastest growing economiesand, in con-
trast to the resource-rich ASEAN countries (except Singapore), are poorly
endowed with natural resources per capita, developments in these two
groups of economies will have increasinglysignificanteffects on eachother's
economicperformance, presentingpossibilitiestherefore for cooperation and
conflict. BecauseKorea is the largest of the Asian NICs, an examination of
ASEAN countries' economic relationswith Koreaassumesparticular interest.
The objective of the present study is two-fold: (1) to describe the
nature of industrial policiesand patterns of industrial growth in the ASEAN
countries as well as to draw some lessonsfrom the industrialization ex-
perience of Korea; and (2) to examine the potential complementarities in
the industrial development of ASEAN and the Asian NlCs, again paying
particular attention to the Korean case.Section II of this paper discussesthe
evolution of industrial policy and development in eachof the ASEAN coun-
tries, indicating the general thrusts of recent industrial promotion policies in
the region. Becausetrade policies form a part, and in the context of the
* An earlierversionof thispaperwaspresentedattheASEAN-KoreaEconomicRela-
tionsConference,KoreaInstitutefor IndustrialEconomicsandTechnology,Seoul,Korea,
3-8,1982.
The authoris Professorof Economicsat the Universityof the Philippineswherehe
iscurrentlyon leave.He isat presentVisitingResearchFellowatthe InternationalFood
PolicyResearchInstitutein WashingtonD.C.
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ASEAN countries a major part, of the overall policy climate affecting the
performance of manufacturing industries, the discussionof industrial policy
inevitably includes the incentive effects of foreign trade regimesadopted.
Section III takes up some trade-related aspects of ASEAN industrial policy
and development, including the growth of exports of labor-intensive manu-
factures, the recent promotion of exports of processedprimary products,
and the role of ASEAN economiccooperation. The discussionthen shifts, in
Section IV, to the Korean industrialization experience from which someles-
sons are drawn that could provide guidance for ASEAN country policy-
makers. Section V follows with an examination of potential areasfor indus-
trial complementarity and trade expansion between the ASEAN countries
and the Asian NICs, given the rising protectionism in the industrialized
countries. The paper ends with some general remarkson the possibilitiesfor
promoting mutually beneficial development through trade in manufactures
among the NICs and the "near-NICs" (including the ASEAN countries)
under the constraint of continuing restrictions in accessto industrialized
country markets.
II. ASEAN INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE
Historically, as the ASEAN countries (except Thailand) were .formerly
colonies of Western powers, their economiesbefore independencewere very
much integrated with thoseof the colonizing countries.Subsequentefforts to
promote industrialization were motivated by the desire to diversify the
economy from an overrelianceon primary production (in the caseof Singa-
pore, on intrepot trade) and, more generally, to redirect the country's pro-
duction capacity away from the goalsof colonialismtoward providing a basis
for modernizing the economy. Almost inevitably, the concomitant desirefor
economic independence"led to an industrialization strategybasedon import
substitution, at least initially. As will be evident in the discussionbelow, the
ASEAN countries differed in the extent and duration of import substitution
policies adopted before eventually shifting to a more outward-looking ap-
proach to industrialization. This would account in part for differencesin the
current state of their industrial development.1 It is perhaps not a coinci-
dence that the two ASEAN countries which were earliest to adopt a liberal
foreign trade regime (Singapore and Malaysia) have the highest per capita
manufacturing value added. Also, throughout most of the last two decades,
the level of protection from foreign competition accordeddomestic industry
hasbeen lowest in thesetwo countries.
In recent years, as part of ASEAN countries' responseto the dramatic
1 Ba_d on WorldBankdata,manufacturingvalueaddedpercapita(in 1975 U.S.
dollars)in 1978 in Singaporewasabout29, 9, 7 and4 timesthoseof Indonesia,Thai-
land,thePhilippinesandMalaysia(cf.Table1).
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developmentsin .the world economy,during the 1970s, industrial policy ad-.
justments were deemed necessaryto help sustainrapid economic growth in
the face of continually changing parameters in the external economic en;
vironment. Even before the last decade drew to a close,there weredevelop-
ments signalling a retreatfrom the vigorous growth of world trade that
characterized most of the postwar period. The 1973-74 oilcrisis and the sub-
sequent stagflation of the industrialized countries had interrupted the im-
pressiveindustrial development and..exportgrowth of the ASEAN countries.
Despite the ensuing.upsurgeof protectionist measures, rapid expansion,of
ASEAN countries' manufactured exports appeared to havebeen restoredby
1976-77. Hopes.for sustainedgrowth, however, were soondashed asthe ex-
ternal-environment againturned adverse.The 1979-80 oil price increases,the
resurgenceof inflation in 1979 and 1980, the sluggishgrowth of industrial
economiessince 1980, and the intensification of protectionism in developed
country markets meant, to the ASEAN countries (and indeed most develop-
ingcountries), a new round of adjustments.
"Industrial restructuring" has taken many forms arn'ongthe ASEAN
countries. For one thing, the increasedpriceof oil hasraiseddifferent policy
concernsfor oil-exporting and oil-importing ASEAN countries.For Indone-
sia especially (lessso for Malaysia), an important consideration is how to
provide adequate incentivesfor non-oil production and exports; sucha diver-
sification is deemedessentialin any successfuladjustment to a dynamic post-
oil future. For the Philippinesand Thailand, both heavily dependent on im-
ported oil (about 85 percent of their energy requirements), the increased
cost of oil has made more urgent the need to earn and saveforeign exchange
efficiently through export expansion and import substitution. Policy efforts
in these two Countrieshave been directed at reducing the import require-
ments of domestic production and replacing more imports by domestically-
produced substitutes. There is recognition also that, while it ismore difficult
to expand exports at a time when world trade is less than buoyant, the
deterioration in the balance of payments makes it more important to do so.
In the caseof Singapore, industrialrestructuring - after the phenomenalsuc-
cessin labor-intensive exportmanufactures - called for the orientation of
investment and production activities toward higher skills and technology
that would enable the population to sustainhigh income growth.
The four resource-richASEAN Countrieshave also begun to actively
encourage the development of basic industries. The underlying motivation
for this seemsto derive from two sources.One is the perception of natural
comparative advantage visA-vis foreign suppliers of products of resource-
based industries.The other reasonis that the establishment of basic indus-
tries is regardedas critical to the balanced development of the manufacturing
sector, not only producing finished goods but also providing the "basic in-
dustrial infrastructure", which is perceivedto be necessary,given the increa_
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ing uncertaintiesin the international economy.
1. Indonesia
Of the five A_;EAN countries, Indonesia is the largest in terms of both
population and land area, but also has the lowest per capita GNP (Table 1).
Its presentlow levelof industrialdevelopment needsto beviewed in the light
of the country's economic stagnation in the 1950s and the greater part of
the 1960s, which began to be reversedonly after the Suharto government
came to power in 1966.
Under the "New Order", the economy's infrastructure wasrehabilitated
after yearsof neglect,particularly the transport, power and communications
sectors. Measures were successfully implemented to reduce the country's
traditionally high inflation rate. Government regulation of private sector
activity was reducedand economic incentivesto private enterprise were re-
stored to encourage production (Paauw, 1981.) at the sametime that partici-
pation of the government in manufacturing activities was de-emphasized.
The 1967 Foreign Investment Law provided generous fiscal incentives.
Accessto imported raw materialsand capital goodswasmadeeasier for both
foreign and domestic firms by a more liberal trade policy.
The launching of Repelita I (First Plan, 1969-74) marked a turning
point in Indonesianeconomic growth. The averageannual GDP increaseof
7.6 percent during the period 1970-79 was almost double that of the 1960-
69 figure. Even more impressivewas the growth of the industrial sector,
which registeredan averageannual rate of 11.3 percent in the seventies.As
documented by Poot (198_1), import substitution was the major sourceof
Indonesian manufacturing growth during 1971-75, especially in food proc-
essing,wheat flour, textiles, paper and fertilizers; on the other hand,domes-
tic demand expansion was the important source of growth in other food
products, cigarettes, transport equipment, wood products, chemicals and
metal products. Subsequently, import substitution appeared to have slack-
ened (Anwar, 1980). Although a few manufactured items,particularly wood
products, registeredvigorousexport growth in the secondhalf of the seven-
ties, domestic demand expansion was clearly the major sourceof industrial
growth during that period.
As shown in Table 2, food, beveragesand tobacco accountedfor more
than one-half of manufacturing value added in Indonesia in 1972; chemicals,
petroleum and rubber and plastic products contributed about one-fifth,
while the shareof textiles, clothing and footwear was 11 percent. By 1979,
the contribution of the first group ha_ldeclined to one-third, the secondhad
also become lessdominant, while the third group, together with metal pro-
ducts, machinery and transport equipment, hadassumedgreatersignificance.
The Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) is the governmentagency
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TABLE2
INDONESIA:COMPOSITIONOFMANUFACTURINGVALUEADDED,1972and1979
(in percent)
1972 1979
Food,beveragesandtobacco 50.8 33.6
Textiles,clothingandfootwear 10.9 15.4
Woodandfurniture 2.9 4.6
Paper,printingandpublishing 2.3 3.5
Chemicals,petroleum,rubberandplastic
products 21.3 17.4
Non-metallicmineralproducts 4.0 8.8
Basicmetals - 1.3
Metalproducts,machineryandtransport
equipment 6.8 15.1
Othermanufactures 1.0 0.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Table3.8 in Wong(1979);Statlstih Industr/ 1979 (Biro PusatStatistik,
Indonesia).
overseeing foreign investment and domestic industrial projects eligible for
incentivesaccording to a priorities list prepared annually by the Board.The
incentives available to existing projects include carry_overlossesfor the first
six year, accelerateddepreciation to a maximum of 2S percent, exemption
from dividend tax, investment allowance of 20 percent for four years, and
exemption from property tax and some fees. For new projects, the follow-
ing additional fiscal incentives are offered: (1) exemptions from import
duties and restrictionson imported machinery and raw materials; (2) exemp-
tion from the corporate income tax, dividend tax and company tax on rein-
vestments for at most five years. BKPM incentiveshavebeen judged to have
a capital cheapening effect, servingto promote large-scale,capital-intensive
industries (Poot, 1981); together with a highly protective tariff structure2
and an increasingly overvalued domestic currency (until the rupiah devalua-
tion in late 1978), they presented severe biasesagainst the development of
labor-intensive industries into a high-growth export sector.
The oil boom since 1974, which raisedthe shareof oil in total exports
from 50 percent to 70 percent, had adverselyaffected Indonesia'smanufac-
tured exports as-wellas import-substituting industries,givingrise to pressures
2 The 1973 tariff reform,whichextensivelyrevisedthe tariff systemandsimplified
its administration,evenresultedin highereffectiveprotectionratesto severalconsumer
goodsindustries(cf.Poor1981).
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for structural change. Recent policy adjustments have been aimed at re-
ducing dependenceon oil exports while maintaining highgrowth. Industrial
export expansion is deemed necessaryto maintain a relatively high growth
rate for the manufacturing sector in the face of a slowerexpansionof domes-
tic demand due to the anticipated decline in GNP growth ratesand reduced
opportunities for import substitution in the coming years. Rapid expansion
in manufacturing in turn would contribute substantially to employment
generation, which is an overriding policy concern in Indonesia.
Some product categoriesof manufactured exports consideredto hold
great promiseare: (i) processedwood products, including sawn timber, ply-
wood, veneer and moldings; (2) mineral-basedproducts suchastin, alumina
and aluminum, and nickel products; (3) labor-intensiveproducts like textiles,
batik garments and leather products; and (4) food productssuch as shrimp
and tapioca chips.
Following years of debate, exporting of logs is being phasedout and a
complete ban is scheduled to take effect in 1985. It is expected that this
would boost exports of processedproducts like sawn timber, plywood,
veneer and perhapseven furniture, and that the increasedvalue added would
offset the fall in export proceeds from logs and at the same time provide
additional employment and earningsto Indonesianworkers.
A number of heavy industry projects have been identified for public
investment, some already being constructed. These include the $2 billion
aluminum smelter project in North Sumatra with an initial production cap-
acity of 75,000 metric tons, a $900 million alumina plant in the bauxite-rich
Bintang Island which would supply'the aluminum smelter 450,000 tons of
alumina by mid-1986 and export the remaining 150,000 tons of the plant's
annual output, and a planned $780 million expansion of a steel complex
operated by state-owned Krakatau Steel to produce cold-rolled steel sheets
meant to replace imports. Among other largescale industrial projects to be
implemented in the near future are a one million-ton capacity cement plant,
two urea fertilizer plants,a $1.7 billion olefin center and a 90,000-ton news-
print plant.
I'he competitivenessof Indonesian exports of labor-intensivemanufac-
tures and processed food products, which suffered as a result of the oil
boom, appeared to have been greatly improved by the large devaluation of
the rupiah in late 1978 (cf. Paauw, 1981 ) and the slight but sustained depre-
ciation against the U.S. dollar since early December of 1981. However, a
major trade liberalization effort and other export promotion measures,in-
cluding improvements in infrastructure and labor skills, are widely consi-
dered to be necessaryfor boosting the longer term prospectsof Indonesian
manufactured exports.
The latest World Bank annual study of the Indonesian economy is re-
ported to share the view of government technocrats "that current difficul-
ties, resulting most immediately from world recessionand the oil glut, may
provide an unexpected opportunity to carry through someof the more pain-
ful adjustmentssuch as improving tax collection and removing subsidies."3
For the longerterm, the policy adjustmentsinvolve: a changein the country's
trade regimetowards greater encouragementof exports; an improvement of
the investment and regulatory environment; an improvement in the effi-
ciency of financial intermediation; and adjustment of domestic pricesto re-
flect economiccosts.
The packageof policy measuresrecently adopted isdesignedto increase
the competitivenessof Indonesian products inworld markets. This included
cheaper export credits, export credit insurance,relaxation of some foreign
exchangecontrols and lower port charges.Also a part of the packageis the
controversial counter-purchasetrade policy which requires foreign com-
panies winning government-sponsoredcontracts to buy back Indonesian
goodsother than oil and gasequivalent in value to the equipment andmate-
rials they bring into the country.4 The governmentis also consideringthe
establishment of export promotion centers abroad and the creation of
trading companies. Finally, there is alsoa need for greatereffort in improv-
ing ports and shipping services,export marketing and quality control, and
incentivesfor all stagesof production of export goods.
2. Malaysia
In Malaysia, conscious efforts by the government to promote indus-
trialization started after independencewith the introduction of the Pioneer
Industries Ordinance in 1958. It provided incentivesto firms with pioneer
status, exempting them from the 40 percent company income tax, among
other fiscal incentives, and providing subsidiesfor infrastructure services
such as electricity, water and transport in industrial estates. The Malaysian
Industrial Development Finance Berhad wascreated in 1960 to extend
medium and long-term loansand technical assistanceto manufacturingenter-
prises, and in 1965, the Federal Industrial Development Authority s was
establishedto overseethe country's industrializationdrive.
Malaysian manufacturing developed at a fast pacefrom 1959 to 1968
under a system of modest tariff protection and liberal investment incen-
tives. The averageannual growth rate of realvalue added in the entire manu-
3 Quotedfrom theFar EesternEconomicReview,june 11-17,1982 issue,p. 1i0.
4 Thishasnot beenpopularlyreceived,criticsclaimingthatit Couldleadto serious
distortionsin the governmentchoiceof businesspartnersandto anartificialoverpricing
of foreignimportssuchascapitalequipment.It is recognized,however,thatthe benefit
of the counter-purchasepolicyis limitedsincethe valueof experts linkedto state-
sponsoredcontractsislessthan3 percentof Indonesia'stotaltrade.
s Laterrenamedthe MalaysianIndustrialDevelopmentAuthority(MIDA).
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facturing sector was 17 percent, while that of pioneer companieswasunder-
standably more impressiveat 58 percent (Lim, 1981 ). Table 3 showsa signi-
ficant decline in the share of agriculture-basedprocessingactivities, while
the newer industries, especially those producing intermediate and invest-
ment goods such as chemicals, non-metallic mineral products, basic metal
products, machinery and transport equipment, apparently grew much faster
and substantially increasedtheir contribution to total manufacturing output.
TABLE3
MALAYSIA:COMPOSITIONOF MANUFACTURING
VALUEADDED, 1959,1968AND 1980
(in percent)
1959 1970 1980
Processingof estate-type
agriculturalproducts 28.9 10.5 )
28.4
Food,beveragesandtobacco 24.1 28.3
Textiles,clothingandfootwear - 2.9 9.9
Woodandfurniture 18.7 13;0
is.0
Paper,printingandpublishing - 7.6
Chenicals,petroleum,rubber
andplasticproducts 16.5 1.7.9 11.0
Non-metallicmineralproducts 3.9 8.2 6.9
Basicmetalsandmetalproducts 4.4 6.6 8.1
Machinery 1.8 2.2 3.4
Transportequipment 1.7 2.9 4.9
Othermanufactures - - 12.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Table7-1in Lim(1981):FourthMalaysianPlan1981-85.
In 1968, the Investment Incentives Act was passedwhich in effect
Supersededthe 1958 ordinance, making important changes in economic
incentives and coverageof firms beyond those obtaining pioneer status; in
particular, export-oriented industrieswere accordedspecificbenefits. Among
other meansof export infrastructure support, free trade zones and export
processingzones were set up in selected parts of Malaysia, and a National
Export Advisory Council and an export insurance system were created to
assistexport development.
Subsequent industrial growth was rapid, manufacturing output having
expanded more than three-fold between 1968 and 1980. As shown in Table
11
3, textiles and clothing, transport equipment and machinery posted sub-
stantial gains in their contribution to total manufacturing production. These
industries also accounted for an increasing proportion of Malaysia's manu-
factured exports in the 1970s (seebelow).
The granting of "pioneer status" remains the most important and fre-
quently given incentives to MIDA-approved projects (Lim et a/. 1981 ). Upon
approval under the pioneer status, the project is exempted from company
tax (40 percent on profits) for two to five years depending on the amount
invested; the period can be extended by a maximum of three years - one
year for meeting each of the following conditions: (1) the firm is located in a
'development area"; (2) its products are "priority products"; and (3) its out-
put meets certain domestic content requirements.
The investment Tax Credit incentive is granted to export firms not
enjoying pioneer status. Tax credit is given in the amount equivalent to 25
percent of the total capital cost, which percentage is increasedby 5 percent
for each of the conditions given above, that the firm is able to satisfy.
Additionally, export firms benefit from accelerated depreciation allowance,
relief from income tax including payroll tax and export allowances.
A third form of fiscal incentives is the Labor Utilization Relief, which is
attractive to firms with low capital-labor ratios. This is similar to pioneer
status except that the period of exemption from the company tax is based
on the number of full-time paid employees, i.e., 2 years for firms employing
from 51 to 100 workers, 3 years for employment size of 101-200, 4 years
for 201-350 and 5 years for more than 351 workers.
Other fiscal benefits include tax-free importation of machinery, equip-
ment and industrial raw materials required to make the project operational,
and tariff protection to selected industries granted by the Tariff Advisory
Board.
It appears from recent evidence that export-oriented projects have
availed widely of industrial incentives under pioneer status, while most im-
port-substituting industries received approval without obtaining incentives.
The role of government in promoting exports is also important in the setting
up of four free trade zones specifically for export-oriented industries, as
shown by the electronics export boom in the second half of the 1970s. It has
been shown, however, that there is a redundancy of incentives for many in-
dustries catering to the domestic market already receiving substantial protec-
tion (Teh, 1977).
The diminishing labor surplus in major industrial areas has made the
active encouragement of labor-intensive manufactured exports (.e.g, electro-
nic products) less compelling, although incentives are being provided to
increase the attraction of dispersal to new areasof lower wage costs.At conti-
nuing source of disappointment among Malaysian officials is the low value
added in these export industries, in view of the heavy reliance on imported
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inputs (about 60 percent of salesvalue in the electronicsindustry) and_so-
ciated lack of investmentsin ancillariesand disseminationof technologyand
skills. Finally, there isalso a perception of the uncertain prospectsof these
major manufactured exports for the 1980s and of the needto further diver-
sify the country's export structure.
The Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85 envisagesthe further development
of resource-basedindustrial projects,particularly in the processingof cocoa,
palm oil and crude petroleum as well as in the manufacture of rubber and
wood-basedproducts for both export and home consumption. The number
of resource-basedindustrial projects licensed by the Malaysian Industrial
Development Authority had increasedfrom 493 in 19"71-75to 685 in 1976-
80; of the latter, 139 were approved in 1980 involvinga total investment of
M$696 million.
The "new dimension" which recent industrial policy in Malaysia has
added, concerns "the promotion of investment in heavy industries," and the
objective is "to strengthenthe linkages and the structure of industrialdevcl-
opment." The manufacture of capital goodsis explicitly cited in the Planas
the next phaseof industrialization that Malaysiawill enter and this is consi-
dered to constitute the second"import substitution wave" following the ex-
haustionof import substitutionopportunities in the consumergoodssector.
To initiate, plan, implement and manageheavy industry projects, the
government established the Heavy Industries Corporation of MalaYSia(HI-
COM) in 1980 with an initial allocation of M$125 million under the Fourth
Malaysia Plan. HICOM has identified severalprojects fbr study and evaiua-
tion which, if found viable, will be implemented during the Plan period.
These projects involve a wide range of products including basicmetals,gen-
eral engineering, transport equipment, other equipment and machinery,
building materials,paper and paper products and petrochemicalproducts.
A broad-ranging review of the structure of industrial incentives in
Malaysia, including incentives for regional dispersal,rapid technology trans-
fer and upgradingof labor skills, is being conducted by a government com-
mittee. Changesto be made will "reflect the priorities of industrial develop-
ment" in the 1980s. Additionally, improvements in the administrative
machinery for granting incentives and protection are being considered in
order to shift the system away from the case-by-base_.pproachand stream-
line administrative procedures.
Malaysian industrial policy for the 1980s seeksto accelerategrowth in
the manufacturing sectorandto achievethe objectivesof the New Economic
Policy (NEP). The NEP was introduced in 1971 to redressthe economic im-
balance of Malaysian society and "eliminate the identification of race with
economic function." Accordingly, greaterbumiputra (mainly Malay) partici-
pation in industries is being encouragedto ensure that the NEP's targets,
especially with respect to equity ownership, employment, distribution of
]3
goodsproduced and useof professionalservicesin the manufacturing sector,
will be attained (Lew Sip Hon, 1981 ).
3. Philippines
Among the ASEAN countries, the Philippineshasthe longesthistory of
consciouspolicies to encourage industrial development. Import substitution
as an industrialization strategy started in 1949 when controls on imports and
foreign exchange•were instituted asan od hoc responseto a severebalanceof
payments problem. What was initially Viewed as a curb on the consumption
of lessessential imports soon became a protective •deviceto encouragepro-
duction of their substitutes. Decontrol and•devaluation in the early 1960s
did not alter very much the incentive structure favoring import-substituting
industries that mainly produced consumer goods at the finishing stages.
Heavy protection was accorded domestic industriesby a "cascading" tariff
structure which servedto maintain the qualitative biasesof the pre-decontrol
policy regime againstbackward integration, export expansion and labor ab-
sorption.
Sluggishmanufacturing growth from the late 1950s8 by which time the
exuberant phase of import substitution had been exhausted, led to a new
comprehensiveapproach to stimulating investment, basedon the Investment
Incentives Act of 1967. The Boardof Investments•(BOI) was created to cen-
tralize the processof assigningindustrial•priorities and to administer•the in-
centives available to local and foreign enterprises in accordance with such
priorities. The benefits to BOI-registered firms included such capital-cheap-
ening incentivesas: (1) tax exemption on imported capital equipment with-
in sevenyears from the date of registration•of the enterprise; (2) tax credit
on domestic capital equipment equivalent to 100 percent of customsduties
and compensatingtax that would have been paid on imports of such items;
(3) accelerated depreciation allowances, as a deduction of taxable income,
permitting fixed assetsto be depreciated up to twice as fast as the normal
rate if expected life is 10 years or lessor depreciated over at least 5 years if
expected life is more than 10 years; (4) tax deduction of expansionreinvest-
ment to the extent of 25 to 50 percent in the caseof non-pioneer projects
and 50 to 100 percent in the caseof pioneer projects; and (5) preferencein
grant of government loans, permitting BOI-registeredfirms to have preferen-
• tial accessto low interest credit.
There is one incentive provision that appears to favor labor employ-
ment, namely, the deduction from taxable income of one-half of the ex-
penseson labor training (but not exceeding10 percent of •directlabor wage).
6 In contrastto the impressive•growth(averaging12.6 percentannually)during
1949-57, manufacturingvalue addedincreasedat an averageannualrate of only 5.7
percentin realtermsfrom1957 to 1969.
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But this would be true only in caseswhere the labor skill acquired can substi-
tute for, rather than be complementary to, capital services(Bautista, 1981 ).
Other benefits afforded BOI-registered enterprises relate less directly
to the relative costing of factors. The following additional incentives seem
neutral with respect to factor use: (i) deduction from taxable income of all
organizational and pre-operating expenses; (2) deduction of net operating
lossincurred in any of the first 10 years of operations; (3) exemption from
all internal taxes, except income tax, to a diminishing extent over time; and
(4) for pioneer enterprises,post-operative tariff protection up to 50 per-
cent of the dutiable value of imported itemssimilar to thosebeingproduced.
By the end of the 1960s, the economy wasagain facing a balanceof
payments crisis, precipitated by the need to serviceshort-term foreign credit
which had financed the trade deficits of the secondhalf of the decade. The
.peso was floated in February 1970, the exchangerate moving from 3.9 to
about 6.4 pesosper U.S. dollar by the end of the year. The Export Incen-
tives Act of 1970 recognized the need to orient local industriestoward the
export marketand to expand non-traditional manufactured exports in order
to counter the economy's chronic balanceof paymentsdifficulties. The new
incentives provided for the first time a direct incentive to employment
through a wagesubsidyequal to the labor cost in the manufacture of exports
(not to exceed 25 percent of the export revenuegenerated).The other prin-
cipal export incentive - a tax credit equal to the sales,compensation, and
specific taxes and duties on suppliesand materialsused in the manufacture
of products for export - wasneutral with respectto factor use.
The de facto devaluation of the domesticcurrency accompaniedby dis-
criminatory "stabilization measures" favoring non-traditional (manufac-
tured) exports7 and the enactment of the Export Priorities Act significantly
improved the incentivestructure for manufactured exports. Severalmeasures
were also adopted in line with export infrastructure development, including
the establishment of an export processingzone and a government trading
corporation to serve as the central clearinghousefor bulk trading and finan-
cing, and efforts at simplifying export documentation and procedures.
The remarkable responseof manufactured exports, which expandedat
an average annual rate of about 50 percent (in current U.S. dollar prices)
during 1970-73, provided the stimulus for the accelerationof manufacturing
growth (from 3.7 percent in 1969 to 14.8 percent in 1973) before being
interrupted by adverseexternal conditions in 1974 and 1975 (cf. Bautista,
Power and Associates, 1979; p. 26). A slow recovery was underway in the
7 The floatingof the Philippinepesoresultedin anexchangerate changefrom
3.9 to 6.4 pesosper u.s. dollarswithinthe year.Exportersof traditionalexportpro-
ducts,however,wererequiredto convertg0 percentof their foreignexchangearnings
at the old rate;thisdualexchangeratearrangementwaslaterreplacedby taxeson tra-
ditionalexportsat ratesrangingfrom4 to 10percentod velorem.
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following years, the manufacturing sector growing at a 6.2 percent annual
averageduring 1975-80.
The policy bias in the 1950s and 1§60s toward import-substituting in-
dustries is reflected in the changing composition of manufacturing value
added. As may be discernedfrom Table 4, such industriesas textiles, paper
products, plastic products, electric appliancesand transport equipment ex-
panded relatively rapidly. These products were mainly import-replacingcon-
sumer goods. In the 1970s, risingexports of clothing and footwear, electro-
nic products, automotive parts and chemicalsenabled the industriesprodu-
cing such products to increasetheir share in manufacturing value added.
Recent efforts at industrial restructuring in the Philippines aims
primarily to improve the country's manufacturing capability in providing a
broader and more competitive export base, and promote "the develop-
ment of an efficient domestic intermediate goods industry." Towards this
end, the government has recently adopted major policy changes relating
to: (1) tariffs and import licensing; (2) export promotion; (3) investment
incentives and administration; (4) industrial revitalization; and (5) imple-
mentation of "major industrial projects." Some of these policy changes
are being implemented in relation to the industrial structural adjustment
loan ($200 million) granted by the World Bank in September1980.
The tariff system in the Philippines had been heavily protective of do-
mestic industry. However, its structure had effectively discriminatedagainst
export-oriented industries which offsetting incentivesgranted in the 1970s
by the Board of Investmentsdid not fully neutralize. As a result of a com-
prehensivereview of the tariff systemduring 1979-80, ExecutiveOrdershave
been issuedcalling for tariff changesthat will reduce the overall level of
effective protection and making the rates more uniform across industries.
Realignment of tariff rates for 14 important industriese over a 5-year period
beganon January 1, 1981. The peak tariff ratesfor other industrieswere re-
duced from 70 percent and 100 percent to 50 percent in two stageson
January 1, 1981 and January 1, 1982. Basedon the schedule of tariff rates
changesfor 1981 to 1985, the averagenominal protection for the manufac-
turing sector will be reduced from 43 percent and 28 percent; consumer
good industries face the largestdecline in effective tariff protection rate -
from 77 percent to 39 percent over the 5-year period (Bautista, 1982). To
complement the tariff reform program, import licensing is also being gra-
dually liberalized.
In 1979 and the early part of 1980, improvements in export incentives
and promotional measureswere instituted through (1) strengtheningand
8 Theseare: food processingandfeed milling,textilesandgarments,leatherpro-
ducts,pulpandpaper,automotive,cement,ceramicsandglassappliances,electricaland
electronicfurniture,ironandsteel,machineriesandthe capitalequipment,motorcyles
andbicycles,andwoodandwoodproducts.
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broadening of fiscal incentives for exportproduction and trading; (b) im-
provement of export financing facilities; (c) simplification of import and ex-
port procedures;and (d) liberalization of bonded manufacturing warehouse
arrangements. Moreover, twelve export processingzones (EPZs) and indus-
trial estates were plannedto be developed during 1981-85, in addition to the
three EPZsalready in existence.
A review of the overall system of investment incentives is.currently
being undertaken with a view of reducing distortions which affect relative
labor use, firm size and location of industriesand improving resourcealloca-
tion. Simplication of Board of Investments proceduresand increasedauto-
maticity in incentive availment are being considered. A significant step to-
ward promoting competition is the phasing out of "over-crowded indus-
tries'" At present, there are only five industries remaining in the list (which
included some 30 industriesin the early 1970s).
Trade liberalization and investment incentive rationalization are being
accompanied by a "revitalization program" designedto assistexisting indus-
tries to produce at lower cost and improve their competitiveness, basedon
"positive" (e.g., technical assistanceand financing) rather than "negative"
(protective) measures. The modernization and expansion of the textile
industry, involving 30 existing textile mills and one entirely new mill, are
being implemented under the $450 million program for the industrly partly
financed by the World Bank. The conversion to coal as fuel for ten cement
plants has been completed, and there are plans for generalrehabilitation and
expansion of the cement industry. Work is also underway on the details of
revitalization programs for other important industries, whose implementa-
tion will be assistedby financing packagesto be arrangedby the World Bank.
Eleven major industrial projects have been identified for implementa-
tion up to 1987that would "produce vital commodities and intermediate in-
puts at internationally competitive prices, induce the establishment of down-
stream labor-intensive industries and enhance the country's technological
capabilities.''a These projects are highly capital intensive and include the
following: copper smelter phosphate fertilizer plant, diesel engine manufac-
turing, cement industry rationalization, coco-chemical plant, aluminum smel-
ter, integrated pulp and paper, petrochemical complex, heavy engineering
industries, integrated steel project and alcogas distillery: The first five of
these projectsare likely to becompleted by.mid-decade;the prospectsof the
others are dimmed by problems of financing and commercial viability. Th'e
aluminum smelter and petrochemical project, currently both in the feasibi-
lity study stage, have been acknowledged as "two of the most difficult pro-
jects."
9 Quotedfrom the Five.YearPhilippine DevelopmentP/on, .1978-1982(Updated
for 1981and1982).
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A key component of the structural adjustment program in the Philip-
pines relates to energy conservation, substitution and resource development,
aimed at substantially reducing the country's dependence on imported oil.
An Energy Priorities •Program has been developed to encourage industries,
through fiscal and other incentives, to shift to coal and non-conventional
sources of energy and to invest in the manufacture of necessary equipment.
The National Energy Program 1981-86 projects a decline in the shareof im-
ported oil in total energy consumption from 87.5 percent to 45.8 percent
over the Program period due to higher contributions by coal, geothermal and
hydroelectric energy, the program requiring at least 1_43 billion at 1981
prices. Financial assistancewill be provided in part from the second World
Bank structural adjustment loan (also $200 million) to be granted in August
• 1982. A third loan of the same amount is being negotiated and will finance
_nainly energy-relatedprojects.
4. Singapore
When it became a self-governing state in 1959, Singapore had an
economy heavily dependent on intrepot trade which was showing signsof
decline and was unable to employ a largesegment of the labor force (Pang
and Tan, 1981 ). To cope with the unemployment problem, the newly-elect-
ed government embarked on an industrialization program aimed at genera-
ting 214 thousand new jobs by 1970, of which 78,000 would be directly in
the manufacturing sector. There was recognition that the limited sizeof the
home market could not provide a long-term basisfor industrial development.
However, it was realized that protection to infant industries, mainly of the
import-substituting type, was necessary. Import duties and quotas on manu-
factured products began to be imposed in 1960, expanding the coverageto
157 imported items by 1965. Even earlier, in 1959, fiscal incentiveswere
made available in the form of tax holidays from 2 to5 years for pioneer in-
dustries, various tax concessionsfor existing firms and accelerateddeprecia-
tion allowance. Industrial growth during 1960-65 was modest (in part be-
causeof the political uncertainty in the early 1960s), manufacturing share in
real GNP risingfrom13.2 percent to 15.6 percent.
The import substitution industrialization program gaveway in the mid-
1960s, in the aftermath of Singapore'sseparation from Malaysia, to an out-
ward-looking strategy emphasizing export-oriented industries. Government
policies and infrastructure support initially concentratedon the promotion
of labor-intensive industries. The Economic Expansion Incentives Act of
1967, which modified the 1959 tax incentives and introduced new ones,
served to reorient the incentive structure favoring export industries. These
benefits included: (1) a 4 percent concessionary tax rate on approved
export profits; (2) tax exemption on interest paymentson approvedforeign
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loans; (3) a 20 percent concessionary tax rate on royalties and fees paid to
foreigners; (4) double tax deductions for export promotion expenses;and
(5) accelerateddepreciation allowance.
Largely due to the "rapid successof export industrialization and mass
employment creation", 1° economic policy since 1970 had placed increasing
emphasison industries requiring higher levels of skill, capital and technol-
ogy11 at the sametime that diversification of the Singaporeaneconomy into
traded services, i.e., tourism, transport and communication, and financial
serviceswas taking place.TM Thus, the tax holiday period for approved pio-
neer firms was extended in 1970 to a maximum of 10 years, and in 1975
financial support for capital-short, high technology firms wasprovided under
the Capital AssistanceScheme.
The manufacturing sector of Singapore underwent rapid growth since
the mid-1960s, its contribution to real GDP risingfrom 15.6 percent in 1965
to 19.7 percent in 1970 to 24.1 percent in 1980. An averageannual growth
rate in industrial production of 12 percent was registered, and manufactured
direct exports as a proportion of manufacturing output increasedfrom 11.9
percent in 1960 to 59.5 percent in 1970 to 65.5 percent in 1980. Domestic
exports grew at phenomenal annual rates of 27 percent during 1960-69 and
42 percent during 1970-79. Undoubtedly, favorable external conditions, i.e.,
a booming international economy and rapid growth of world trade aswell as
the expansion of multinational investment in offshore sites,played a critical
role in ensuring the successof Singapore'sexport-led industrialization stra-
tegy. It also bears emphasisthat the government has consistently adopted a
liberal policy toward foreign investment, actively promoting the participa-
tion of foreigners in the economy by developing an investment climate that
allows foreign investors to fully exploit profit-making opportunities. Among
the ASEAN countries, Singapore and Malaysia have attracted the bulk of
direct foreign investment in the region (about 72 percent of the averagean-
nual value of $US1.64 billion during 1977-79). In the case of Singapore,
about 85 percent of direct export salesin recent years havebeen contributed
by foreign firms.
Table 5 gives some indication of the shifts in Singapore's industrial
structure since 1960. The share of textile, clothing and footwear which are
labor-intensive production activities in manufacturing value added is seen.
to have increased from 1960 to 1970 but not from 1970 to 1980. Also, the
10 Accordingto Pang(1982), Singapore,whoseunemploymentrate wasover10
percentintheearly1960s,reachedfullemploymentin theearlyseventies.
11 This wasinterruptedbriefly by the world recessionin the mid-1970sbut was
intensifiedsince1979.
12 The shareof thesesectorsin Singapore'sGDP increasedfrom 38.8 percentin1970to 45.5 percentin1980.
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TABLES
SINGAPORE:COMPOSITIONOF MANUFACTURING
VALUEADDED,1960,1970,1981
(in percent)
1960 1970 1981
Foodandbeverages 25.6 10.2 4.5
Textiles 3.1 2.2 1.7
Wearingapparel 3.1 3.0 2.9
Woodproducts 7.1 5.5 1.8
Furniture 1.0 1.0 1.0
P_er Productsandprinting 18.5 5.8 4.7
Chemicalproducts 6.8 4.5 4.8
Petroleum 6.8 19.2 18.4
Rubberandplasticproducts 2.6 2.9 2.4
Non-metallicminerals 3.8 3.0 2.6
Fabricatedmetalproducts 7.6 6.6 4.6
Machineryandappliances 10.1 14.2 32.3
Transportequipment 5.8 14.6 13.8
Precisionequipment 6.7 0.3 1.4
Otherproducts 6.7 5.0 .1.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Report on the Censusof Industri¢l Production, 1.960(Departmentof
Statistics,Singapore);Yeerboohof Stetistic_Singapore,!978-79 (Depart-
ment of Statistics,Singapore);Econornlc Survey of Singopore, 1981
(Ministryof TradeandIndustry,Singapore).
contributions of the metal and wood industriesdeclined over the two de-
cadesbut more rapidly in the seventies.By 1980, three major industrieshad
emerged, namely, electrical machinery, petroleum and transport equipment.
Together, they accounted for close to two-thirds of manufacturing produc-
tion. In view of the capital intensivecharacter of these industries,their em-
ployment contribution of about 45 percent wasmuch smaller.
As indicated above, industrial policy in Singaporebeganto shift to the
promotion of higher value industries in the early 1970s. This was de-em-
phasized, however, in the mid-1970s in view of the recessionin the interna-
tional economy. In 1979, the governmentadopted three setsof measureshe-
raiding what has been termed a "Second Industrial Revolution" (Pang,
1982). First, a wage correction policy wasintroduced in an effort to restore
wages to market levels; it was felt that since 1972, National WagesCouncil
(NWC) guidelines on wage increaseswere relatively modest, effectively sup-
pressingwage rates and encouragingexcessiveuseof labor serviceswhich in
turn led to labor shortagesand slow productivity growth. Large wage in-
2]
creasesaveraging20 percent annually over the three-year period from 1979
to 1981 were recommended by the Council, designedto force firms to im-
prove efficiency of labor use. It hasalso beenannounced that future wage in-
creaseswill be closely tied to increasesin productivity.
A second set of new industrial policy measuresentailed changesin in-
vestment incentives and the reorientation of incentives toward the promo-
tion of a more limited number of priority industries;thesefavored industries
are highly skill- and capital-intensive, producing technologically sophisticated
products. Some of these products are: computers and peripheral equipment,
instrumentation and industrial controls, precision machine tools and accesso-
ries, photographic and optical equipment, oil field equipment, aircraft com-
ponents and specialty industrial chemicals. The new investment incentives
are designed to foster rapid technology transfer, allowing for the accelerated
depreciation of machinery and equipment for R and D, double deduction for
R and D expenditures and writing off of lump sum payments for manufac-
turing licenses. On the other hand, tariff protection has been removed for
some industries catering mainly to the domestic market, e.g., automotive
assembly and other consumerdurables-producingindustries(airconditioners,
television sets, refrigerators); this is aimed at promoting their efficiency or,
in the case of internationally uncompetitive industries like automotive as-
sembly and related industries,at phasingout suchactivities.
A final component of Singapore's industrial restructuring strategy has
to do with the expansionof training and educational facilities for both pros-
pective and already employed industrial workers, providing complementary
support for the upgrading of skill and technology in industry. Manpower
training, especially in the technical and professional fields, has been given
emphasis Since 1979, and this is reflected in sharply increased enrollments
not only in professional faculties at the National University of Singapore but
also in the technical and vocational schools, and in the establishment of in-
dustrial training centers (sometimes jointly with private industry, interna-
tional companies and/or industrialized country governments). A national_
computerization campaign has also been launched, aimed at laying a base for
the development of a computer-software industry to spearhead the country's
long-term effort to move away from labor-intensive to high-technology in-
dustry (Economic Survey of Singapore, 1981 ).
5. Thailand
Modern industrialization in Thailand began only in the early sixties.
The First Development Plan (1961-66), although vague on the role of in-
dustry, was Specificin declaring that the government would promote indus-
trialization through the provision of economic infrastructure suchaselectri-
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city, transportation and communication facilities to private enterprises.With
the introduction of the New Investment Promotion Act in 1962, a policy of
import substitution was adopted, relying on protective tariffs and indirect
subsidizationunder the industrial promotion scheme.Three classesof indus-
tries promoted by the Board of Investments (BOI) were distinguished. In-
dustries Classified under Group A, Group B and Group C were given full,
one-half and one-third exemption, respectively,from import duties and busi-
nesstaxes on imported raw materials and intermediate inputs. Except for
those in Group C, nearly all industries included in the promotion list were
import-substituting. Industriesproducingfor the domestic market continued
to be promoted under the Second Five-Yeor Plan (1967-71), which however
gave importance to industriesutilizing domestic materialsas the exemptions
from tariff and businesstaxes on imported inputs were reducedto one-third,
effectively doing away with the earlier distinction among promoted indus-
tries.
The specificationof minimum plant sizesin the BOI-promotion list led
to the establishment of large-scalemanufacturing firms, which in general
were found to be more capital intensiveand import dependent than smaller-
sized firms (Tambunlertchai and I_oohawenchit, 1981). As in the Philippine
case,Thailand's manufacturing industrieswhich were promoted in the 1960s
were unable to absorb much of the country's unemployed and under-
employed labor force.
By the early 1970s, government policy beganto placegreater emphasis
on export industries. In 1972, tl_e Export Promotion Act was introduced
providing for a rebate of import duties and businesstaxes on imported in-
puts, among other incentives. An Export Promotion Committee was esta-
blished in the same year taskedwith coordinating export promotion efforts.
The Board of Thailand began to offer rediscount facilities with preferential
interest rate for commercial banks to provide short-term financing to ex-
porters. Nonetheless, import substitution policies, especially tariff protec-
tion persisted through the decade even as manufactured exports were
actively being promoted. Average effective protection rates have been ob-
served to be particularly high for consumergoods, both durable and non-
durable, and appear to have increased significantly from 1974 to 1978
(World Bank, 1980).
Manufacturing value added in Thailand grew at an averageannual rate
of 11 percent at constant prices in the 1960s and 1970s. Next to domestic
demand, import substituion was the major sourceof growth in the sixties,
while export expansion became the second most important source in the
seventies(World Bank, 1980).
Processedfood, beveragesand tobacco heavily dominated Thai manu-
facturing in the early 1960s (see Table 6). This sector's share diminished
through the sixties and seventieswith the growth of Import-replacing indus-
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TABLE6
THAILAND:COMPOSITIONOFMANUFACTURINGVALUEADDED,1962-1972,1979
(in percent)
1960 1972 1979
Food 36.4 18.6 15.3
Beverages 10.7 9.0 11.6
Tobaccoandsnuff 13.4 9.3 6.6
Wearingappareland 3.9 6.1 10.0
make-uptextilegoods
Textiles 2.6 12.2 14.3
Woodandcork 4.7 2.5 1.4
Furnitureandfixtures 1.3 1.1 0.9
Paperandpaperproducts 0.3 0.7 1.2
Printing,publishing 2.0 2.5 2.6
andalliedindustries
Leatherandleatherproducts 1.6 1.1 0.5
(andfootwear)
Rubberandrubberproducts 2.8 1.8 2.6
Chemicalsandchemicalproducts 6.3 5.7 6.6
Petroleum,refiningandc0al - 8.6 5.9
Non-metallicmineralproducts 5.7 5.7 5.9
Basicmetals 0.2 1.8 1.2
Electricalmachineryandsupplies 0.5 1.4 1.7
Non-electricalmachinery 3.3 2.2 1.7
Transportequipment 3.3 5.0 7.8
Othermanufactures 4.3 4.4 3.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Nat/onal Income of Thai (1966 edition)andTable 8.3 in World
Bank(1980).
tries (petroleum products, transport equipment and non-durable consumer
goods) and the expansion of non-traditional manufacturedexports (textiles,
clothing and electronic products).
Thailand, which like the Philippines, is a recipient of the World Bank's
structural adjustment loan amounting to US$150 million and approved in
March 1982, is in the processof introducing a wide range of fundamental
reforms not only in industry and energy but also in agriculture, fiscal policy
and development administration. According to the Fifth Five-Yeor Plan
(1982-86), Thailand will face very seriousand complex economic problems
and social tensions"if structural adjustmentsand policy redirectionsare not
timely made and effectively implemented." The objectives of the adjust-
ment program are to reduce the fiscal and current account deficits in the
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short term while raisingthe longer term productivity of the agricultural and
industrial sectors.
The industrial strategy aims to increase production and productivity
in manufacturing, which sector is targeted to grow at an annual rate of 7.6
percent during the Plan period 1989_-86. It includes policy efforts to reduce
protection to domestic industry and encourage manufactured exports and
promote regional dispersal of industry. Investment incentives are to be im-
proved in ways that would promote a sustained growth of industrial invest-
ments directed toward the most efficient uses.Expanded infrastructure sup-
port will be provided, among others, by the establishment of five industrial
estatesin addition to the four already existing.
Some policy measuresrecently adopted are consistentwith the objec-
tive of reducing the existing biasesagainst manufactured exports. Rebates
on taxes and tariffs paid on imported intermediate inputs usedin export pro-
duction have been liberalized by eliminating the budget constraint and
authorizing the calculation of ad valorern rebatesby category. Some steps
have also been taken toward the implementation of comprehensive tariff
changeswhich will lower effective protection ratesfor import-substituting
industriesand raise those for export industries.Apparently, levelsof protec-
tion had risen since the mid-1970s due to government efforts to stimulate
domestic investment. The 1977 Investment Promotion Law, which gavethe
Board of Investment additional promotional and discretionary powers, ap-
peared to have effectively reinstituted the import substitution strategy for
Thai industrialization (Akrasanee, 1980).
It is now widely recognized that expansion of manufactured exports
could contribute significantly not only to employment creation, because
Thai export industries tend to be relatively labor-intensive, but also to the
alleviation of the country's severecurrent account deficits which in the last
five years averaged more than $1 billion. In a longer term context, it is also
expected to promote a more efficient production structure and hasten future
industrialgrowth.
The development of "basic industries," including iron and steel, fer-
tilizer, soda ash and newsprint, has received increasing attention in recent
years, especially with the expected production of natural gas.To the Min-
istry of Industry, the establishment of basic industriesrepresentsthe next
stageof Thai industrialization (Akrasanee, 1980). There has also been some
recent initiatives to support large-scale,capital-intensive projects by the
Board of Investment, which is known to favor the setting up of an integrated
steel plant. The Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand have alsoex-
pressedreadinessto assistin the financing of basic industrial projects,using
both domestic and foreign funding sources.It appearslikely, therefore, that
Thai industry, as in the Philippine case,would alsomove signifiCantlytoward
import substitution in intermediate products in the 1980s.
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In the field of energy, the country is not expected to break its depen-
dence on imported oil during the decade. This is despite the recent discove-
ries of natural gas, production of which is planned to reach at least 525 mil-
lion cubic feet per day in 1986, and the expanded production capacity of
lignite beginning 1984. For the Plan period, the target for oil imports is a
zero growth rate in volume; this would require "that domestic oil price must
be frequently and realistically adjusted," and that "energy saving measures
must be seriously implemented." In the past, Thailand hadnot adequately
adjusted domestic prices of refined petroleum products, slowing down con-
servation efforts and reduction of the energy intensity of the country's
economic structure (World Bank, 1980).
III. TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
1. Trade in manufactured products
The discussionin the precedingsection on ASEAN countries' industrial
policy and development indicatesthat trade has been an important compo-
nent of the industrialization strategy. Although the early phaseof their
industrial development gave emphasis,to the replacement of imports, the
ASEAN countries sooner or later moved toward more manufacturing for
export. Lacking a sizable domestic market, Singaporeand Malaysia quickly
shifted to exporting of manufactured goods in the mid-sixties and late
sixties, respectively_The Philippines.andThailand beganto focuson exports
of manufactures in the early 1970s. More recently, the Indonesiangovern-.
ment has recognizedthe need to expand non-oil exports, including manufac-
tured exports during the Repelita III period(1978/79-83/84) owing to the
uncertain prospectsof oil production and exports.
As evident from Table 7, there was rapid growth of ASEAN manufac-
tured exports through the 1970s, despite adverse conditions in the world
economy.TM Manufactured exports were almost unheard of in the early six-
ties, except in Sin@pore (whereslightly over one-fourth of total exports in
1960 were products of light industry); by the late seventies,manufacturers
comprised more than one-third of Philippine expo_s, one-fourth of Thai-
land's and one-fifth of Malaysia's (Table 8)_ Industrial market economies
accounted on the averagefor 58 percent of ASEAN countries manufactured
exports in 1978,14 rangingfrom 47 percent for Indonesia to 78 percent for
the Philippines (Table 9); slightly lessthan 40 percent to other developing
countries while capital-surplus oil. exporters accounted for lessthan 3 per-
cent.
13SeealsoAppendixTablesla to lc.
14 About 23 percentwentto the EECcountries,another23 percentto theUnited
Statesand10percento Japan.
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TABLE7
ASEANCOUNTRIES:EXPORTSOF MANUFACTURERS*,1965-1978
(currentU.S.milliondollars)
1965 1970 1975 1978
Indonesia 10.9 11.9 75.0 226
Malaysia 67.8 151.7 664.4 1714
Philippines 65.8 78.4 258.9 1136
Singapore 300.4 427.6 2232.6 4679
Thailand 12.i 38.6 332.0 1039
*SITC5 to 8, Series68. Includesre-exportsto Singapore.
SOURCE: Table12.5 in Hughes(1980),Table12 in WorldDeve!opment1981.
There are some differences in the commodity composition of ASEAN
manufactured exports (see Appendix Table la to Ic). Singapore, the largest
exporter of manufactured products among the ASEAN countries_has had
remarkable success in exporting engineering goods (such as electrical
machinery and telecommunications equipment) and chemicals.At the other
extreme, Indonesia, whoseexports of manufacturesis smallest in the region,
has wood productsas the most important industrialexport category. Manu-
factured exports of Malaysia have the largest concentration in electronic
products, wood manufactures aad processedfood. For Thailand, exportsof
textiles, garments, jewelry and processed food have grown most rapidly.
Finally, in the Philippines, the bulk of manufactured exports has been
contributed by garments, electronic products,food manufactures and handi-
crafts.
These patterns of export product concentration appear to conform to
the ASEAN countries' comparative advantage in international trade. All the
ASEAN economies except Singaporehave rich natural resourcesand, in the
early 1970s, also had abundant labor. Their factor endowments therefore
favored the production and export of natural resource-based products (e.g.,
processedfood, wood products, jewelry) and labor-intensive goods (e.g.,gar-
ments, textiles, electronic products) requiring low levelsof capital and tech-
nology. The latter type of products had been the concentration of Singa-
pore's exports in the 1960s when the labor force was underutilized and
wageswere low; this gave way to more technology- and capital-using export
products (e.g., electrical machinery, telecommunications equipment, chemi-
cals) in the seventies as full employment was reached and labor cost in-
creased.
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As far as ASEAN imports are concerned, machinery and equipment
constitute the most important product category, .increasingsignificantly its
share in total merchandise imports of all but one of the ASEAN countries
in the 1960s and 1970s, as shown in Table 10. Other manufactures, pre-
sumably in the high technology fieldl: are also seen in the table to account
for a major share of ASEAN imports in the late seventies.These manufac-
tured imports were sourcedmainly from developedcountries, the majorcon-
tributors being Japan, (38 percent), the United States (18 percent) and EEC
codntries (20 percent). In the Philippines and Thailand, the observeddoub-
ling of the fuel share from 1960 to 1978 largely reflects the difficulty of
developing and substituting indigenousenergy sourcesfor imported oil after
the drasticoil price hike in 1973-74.
Producer goods categories, especially capital equipment, have in-
creasinglydominated eachASEAN country's list of ten largestimports (Ap-
pendix Tables 2a-2e), reflecting a heavy reliance on external sourcesfor the
physical capital and intermediate good requirements of ASEAN's expand-
ing manufacturing sector. This pattern of import concentration seemscom-
patible with prevailing co_nparativeadvantage as the principal suppliers are
high income (wage)countries exporting products of low labor intensity,is
2. Promotion of basicindustries
As pointed out earlier, an emerging new component of /(SEAN in-
dustrial policy except in Singapore, is .the active encouragement of basic
(heavy, major) industries. Someof these industries are natural resource-
based, and the four ASEAN countries have understandably viewed the pos-
sible increasesin domestic value added of their resource-basedproductsand
expansion of processedexports as an additional meansof promoting indus-
trialization. One could discern also from official pronouncementsTM some
element of economic nationalism seeking to correct what is perceivedto be
an existing colonial trade pattern.
Processingof primary products for exports should of coursebe evalua-
ted by the same criteria as those applied to other industrial projects. It is
possiblethat in some cases,the very high capital-, scale-or energy-intensity
of the existing technology could offset completely the country's advantage
of already producing the primary or semi-processedcommodity. MoreoVer,
the need to import intermediate inputscould significantly reduce the net
foreign exchange gain from exporting processedrather than primary pro-
15BasedcrnGarnaut-Anderson's(1980;p.4i 1) listingof 3-digitSITCmanufacturing
industriesby laborintensityof production.
16 As in the followingquotation:"Only thencanwe takeour legitimateplacein
the ranksof thenewly-industrializedcountriesandthusfulfill theaspirationsof develop-
ing nationswithin the neweconomicorder as promulgatedby the UnitedNations"
(LewSipHon,1981).
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ducts. Finally, questionsmight alsoariseconcerningmarket prospects.
Not all the basic industries being promoted in the ASEAN countries
are resource-based,and in some instances, even those of the latter type
would not be linked to domestic primary production (e.g., alumina for the
planned aluminum smelter plant of the Philippines is to be imported). In
such cases,it is far from clear that the ASEAN countries will havecompara-
tive advantage, considering the large capital requirementsand highly capital-
intensive nature of those industries.Viable levelsof production are bound to
be very high relative to the domestic market in view of scale economies
characterizing heavy industries, in which case,a largeamount would haveto
be exported. For institutional and economic reasons,marketing of such pro-
ductsabroad may prove to be a difficult problem.
Having to promote basic industriesfor the sole purpose of ensuringa
balanceddevelopment of the manufacturing sector would seeman economic-
ally untenable position for ASEAN countries, given their high degree of
openness.The setting up of uneconomic large-scaleprojects producinginter-
nationally uncompetitive intermediate products would effectively hinder
rather than stimulate production in downstream industries. It would usedis-
proportionate amounts of scarceinvestmentresourcesand result in lesslabor
absorption. Overenthusiasm with large-scale,capital- and energy-intensive
industrial projects can only lead to increased inefficiency in the manufac-
turing sector, higher prices for industrial goods and reduced international
competitiveness. Politically, it could also make more difficult the full imple-
mentation of trade liberalization plans drawn up as part of on-goingstructu-
ral adjustment programs in someASEAN countries.
3. ASEAN economiccooperation
The high degree of opennessof the ASEAN countries17 makes them
vulnerable to the vagariesof foreign markets. Becauseof the uncertain pros-
pects of expanded exports to extra-regional markets, and also in view of the
relatively slow pace and insubstantial achievements thus far of ASEAN
economic cooperation, there has been a growingrecognition within ASEAN
in recent years of the need to more closely integrate the economicactivities
of member countries.18
The economic case frequently made for regional industrial cooperation
among-developing countries derives from the expected gains from scale
17 Degreeof opennesson tradeorientation,representedby the ratioof exports
to.GDP in 1979 (of. Table1), ishighestfor Singaporeat 18 percentandlowestfor the
Philippinesat 19percentwhichisstillhighby internationalstandards.
18 In his openingstatementat the lastmeetingof ASEAN ForeignMinistersheld
in June1982 in Singapore,PhilippineMinisterCarlosRomulo"urgedthe development
of a nbwcomprehensiveframeworkof cooperationwhichwouldmakeintegrateddevel-
opmentnearerto ASEANreach.!'
economiesand increasedspecialization.Given the state of technology,if
large-scaleproductionisrequiredfor the economicviabilityof certain invest-
ment projects,at leasttwo difficultiespresentthemselvesthat may deter
inidividualASEAN countriesfrom undertakingsuchprojects.Theseare the
smallnessof the nationalmarket and the largeamountof capital that is re-
quired. The establishmentof "ASEAN industrialprojects" (AIPs)offersa
solution to theseproblemsby assuringaccessto a regionalmarket through
preferential arrangementsand by sharingthe capital cost of any regional
project among the cooperatingcountries. On the other hand, under the
ASEAN industrialcomplementation(AIC) scheme,cooperatingmanufactu-
rers would be able to specializemore narrowly and to produceat lower
pricespartsand componentsat highoptimum output levelsfor the regional
market, again with preferential accesswithin the region relative to non-
ASEANcompetingproducts.
Preferential trading arrangementsof courseentail some sacrifice in
economic efficiency. Under certain conditions, though, this would be
justifiable. Regional infant industriesproducingintermediate and capital
goodsmay needprotectionfrom outsidesuppliersastheycannot, in general,
be expectedto be immediatelycompetitiveinternationally.If thealternative
is import substitutionof theseproductsat the nationallevel(whichisprob-
ably the casefor eachof the ASEAN countriesexcept Singapore)involving
high-costindustrialplants,then the regionalprojectswouldbeeconomically
worthwhileeven in the short run. ASEAN countriescollectivelymay also
wishto havea morediversifiedind'ustrialstructurethat couldprovidebetter
protectionagainstexternal instabilitiesand greaterautonomyfor the region
in dealingswith the restof the world.Suchnon-economicgoalswill haveto
be reconciledwith the real needto advancethe economicwell-beingof the
region'spopulation.
As pointed out, ASEAN industrialcooperationsofar hasbeenrather
limited and slow-moving.Of the five ASEAN industrial projects initially
identified,the dieselengineplant hasbeendroppedby Singaporewhilethe
Philippines'phosphaticfertilizer project hasbeenreplacedfirst by a news-
print projectandmorerecently,by a copperfabricatorplant (whichreceived
approvalfrom the ASEAN EconomicMinistersonly in early 1982). While
the two urea projectsbasedin Indonesiaand Malaysiahavetaken off the
ground, Singaporeappearsto have lost interest in contributinga regional
project. As to industrialcomplementation,progressto datehasbeen made
in decidingon the first batch of AIC productscoveringautomotivepro-
ducts_but the precisenature of preferential arrangementshas yet to be
workedout.
An even moredistressingobservationisthe apparentlackof coordina-
tion of national projects,especiallylarge-scaleprojects,amongthe ASEAN
countries.Singaporehadto giveup the dieselengineplantasa regionalpro-
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ject becauseat least two of the other ASEAN countries have firm plans of
their own to produce•diesel engines as national projects. Also, the Philip-
pines' copper fabricator project is not assuredof the Malaysian market in
view of the latter's own production of copper wire rods. Furthermore, there
is the unresolved issue of an Indonesian national project competing with
Thailand's soda ashproject.
Despite the recent overproduction of aluminum worldwide and of fall-
ing prices in part due to expanding capacities, Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippineshave plans to set up aluminum smeltersas national projects. Un-
coordinated national planning of heavy industries seemsto be the casealso
in the cement,19 fertilizer, petro(:hemical, newsprint, Steel•and other• indus-
tries, indicating a lack of seriouseffort among ASEAN national governments
to •exploit the benefits of specialization in large-scaleindustries within the
region. Self-reliant industrialization in this context is aimed at reducing de-
pendence on foreign suppliers of what are perceived to be critical •inter-•
mediate products of heavy industries. The inability to foster a more coordi-
nated and rational planning of these industriesamong the ASEAN countries
betrays a lack of confidence in one's regional trade partners as reliable sup-
pliers of such products. This necessarilyentails Someeconomic cost to each
of the ASEAN countries which, given the financial requirements of the pro-
jects, can be very substantial.
It is clear that there are potential complementarities within ASEAN
based on differences in natural resourcesendowment. The development ofw
resource-basedindustries in the region, if not basic industriesin general, will
benefit greatly from a harmonization of national projects among the ASEAN
countries,which however would require a.greaterdegreeof political goodwill
than hasbeen displayed in the past.
In the area of preferential trading arrangements(PTA), the large num-
ber of products now eligible for intra-ASEAN tariff preferences (8,529
items) is rather misleading in view of the high degreeof disaggregationused
(e.g., distinguishing various kinds of bread, various categories of matches
based on the number contained in each box, etc.). The margin-of preference
on existing duty is normally 10 percent, but goods having an import value of
$1 million or lessin 1978 qualify for a 20-25 percent cut in tariffs.
The impact of trade liberalization efforts has yet to be felt by the
ASEAN countries, since most of them are unwilling to open up their domes-
tic markets to regionalcompetition and have kept trade concessionsto
strictly marginal imports. Until intra-ASEAN trade liberalization beginsto
involve import commodities directly competing with local products, it isdif-
19 Totalsupplyin the ASEANcountriesof cement,a commoditywidelyacknowl-
edgedto havehightransportprotectionwithintheregion,hasbeenprojectedto beabout
47 milliontonsby 1985,exceedingtotalASEANdemandby 7 milliontons,•witheach
countryexceptMalaysiafacingasurplusinthenationalcementmarket.
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ficult to see how gainsfrom the PTA can become important for the rational-
ization of the industrial structure of the ASEAN countries, promoting effi-
cient intra-industry specialization within the region. This would apply espe-
cially to the non-traditional manufactured exports whose capacity to re-
spond to economic incentives has already been well demonstrated. Expan-
sion of the intra-ASEAN trade in manufactures will also offset, at least
partially, the adverse effects of the increasing restrictions faced by ASEAN
manufactured exports in their principal markets (the OECD countries).
The PTA, to be meaningful, has to move away from the cumbersome
inter-governmental negotiations on a product-by-product basis towards a
system of scheduledacross-the-boardtariff reductions with increasingdepth
of tariff cuts (of. Bautista, 1980). The important point is that the lowering
of intra-ASEAN trade barriers, both tariff and non-tariff barriers, must be
accelerated if the member countries are to reapsubstantial benefits from in-
creased specialization and trade. It is also difficult to envisagesignificant,
sustained advances in the other major instruments of ASEAN industrial
cooperation (i.e., the AlP and AIC schemes)unless the resistanceto a more
meaningful reduction of intra-ASEAN trade restrictions isovercome.
If the ASEAN countries seemed not overly aggressivein promoting
intra-regional trade as suggestedabove, it is presumably becauseof the rela-
tive succesthat they have enjoyed, until very recently, in expanding exports
to non-ASEAN countries, especiallynon-traditional manufactured exports to
the OECD countries. But with the recent slowing down of world economic
activity, increasingprotectionist sentiments, and resulting substantial reduc-
tion in demand for ASEAN exports.2° it might be expected that intra-
ASEAN trade cooperation efforts would pick up. Indeed, wider product
coverage and deeper tariff cuts are forthcoming with the recent ministerial
approval to extend the automatic eligibility for ASEAN preferential treat-
ment to import items which had a total import value of US$2.5 million or
less in 1978. Moreover, the eventual establishmentof an ASEAN free trade
area has beenformally proposedand is now under study.
IV. LESSONS FROM KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION
Like Singapore,South Korea turned to export promotion at a relatively
early phase of the industrialization process. During the second half of the
1950s and early 1960s, import substitution, mainly in non-durable consumer
goods, was the major source of Korea's industrial expansion. As the growth
20 Asreflectedin the recentreversalof tradebalancesor increasingsizeof trade
deficits,namely: Indonesia- $2.5 billionin fiscalyear 1981-82(from a surplusof
$2.4 billionin 1980-81);Malaysia- $30millionin 1981(from a surplusof $2.1billion
in 1980); Philippines- $2.5 billionin 1981 (from $1.9 billionin 1980);Singapore-$6.6 billioninJanuary-May198:2;andThailand- $3.1billionin 1981.
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impetus from import substitution showed signsof faltering, however, Korean
industrial policy began to shift, from about 1962, toward the promotion of
labor-intensive manufactured exports. By 1965, trade liberalization and
other major policy reforms were practically completed, marking a "turning
point" in the country's export and industrial growth (Westphal and Kim,
1977).
Korea's merchandiseexports grew at a phenomenalaverageannual rate
of about 35 percent at constant pricesfrom 1962 to the later seventies,con-
tributing to the achievement of one of the world's highest annual growth
rates in GNP per capita of nearly 8 percent during the period (Hong, 1979).
The shareof manufactured exports to total exports rosefrom 14 percent in
1960 to 82 percent in 1975. Rapid growth of manufactured exports was
largely responsiblefor the marked expansionof manufacturingoutput which
posted an average annual rate of 18 percent, raising its share in GNP from
9 percent in the early 1960s to about 32 percent in 1978. BecauseKorea's
export-led industrial development was labor intensive, it led to a decline in
unemployment rate from 9 percent in the early sixties to 3.2 percent in
1978, and to an averageannual increasein real wagesby more than 7 percent
during the period (Park, 1981). From all indications, Korea hasbeen able to
exploit successfully its initial comparative advantage in labor-intensivepro-
ducts, transforming the country to an industrialized, internationally compe-
titive economy, with one of the largest manufacturing sectors among
present-daydevelopingeconomies.
Several aspects of Korean industrial policy and development are of
direct relevance to ASEAN industrialization efforts. First, the Korean ex-
perience demonstratesthat the benefits from specialization and trade along
lines of comparative advantagecan be very substantialeven for moderately
sized economies. As has been documented by Westphal and Kim (1977),
manufactured exports of Korea during the 1960s were more labor-intensive
than manufactured imports; indeed, the degreeof labor intensity in export
production hadincreased as manufacturing industriescatering to the domes-
tic market became more capital intensive over time. The extent to which
labor-intensive manufactured exports had contributed to the solution of
Korea's employment problem and the associatedimprovement in income
distribution is remarkable, and provides a living model for labor-surplus
developing countries seeking to industrialize as a means of promoting na-
tional incomegrowth aswell asdistributive equity.
Export-led growth in Korea has alsocontributed to the mobilization of
both domestic and foreign resources without which the vigorous develop-
ment of the industrial sector could not have been sustained(Park, 1981).
Domestic savingsrose from lessthan 1 percent of GNP in 1960 to 19 percent
in 1969 to 26 percent in 1978, assumingtherefore an increasingly important
role in financing investment. Foreign capital inflows to Korea were substan-
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tial in the form of official development assistance(foreign aid) until the
early sixties and subsequently in the form'of private foreign capital. During
1960-1975, about 40 percent of total investmenf in Korea was financed
from abroad (Westphaland Kim, 1977).
The role of foreign capital inflows should not be overstated, however.
Their availability, especially private foreign capital, hasbeen due in largepart
to Korea's_favorable export performance and, hence, cannot be considered
"exogenous". Likewise, foreign capital inflows appear to have been used
efficiently, at least, by the standardsof developing countries.
Direct foreign investment cannot be said to have played a dominant
part in Korea's industrial and export growth; its share in manufacturing
capital stock was lessthan 5 percent in 1970, while accounting for only 11
percent of exports (Westphal and Kim, 1977). Korea did not also have to
rely on its "special relationship" with Japan and the United States in ex-
panding its export sales;the importance of these two countries as export
markets diminished significantly since the early 1960s.21 Furthermore,
Korea has been successfulin establishingan indigenousbaseof technological
know-how and marketing expertise (Westphalet al., 1981 ).
Perhapsthe most important aspectof Korean industrial policy, and the
one most relevant to the ASEAN countries, isthe successwith which a rela-
tively uniform incentive structure within the manufacturing sector hasbeen,
for the most part, sustainedsince major policy changes were made in the
first half of the 1960s. According to Westphal and Kim (1977), "by main-
taining the exchangerate near the free trade level and grantingexporters free
accessto imported inputs, the governmenthas,overall, been able to provide,
on the average, roughly equal incentivesto production for domestic saleand
for export." This contrasts with the strong tendency among developing
countries to overvalue the domestic currency and to deny exporters the
benefit of a free trade regime, effectively protecting the domestic market
but discriminating againstexport sales.
Korean industrial policy served to protect do'nestle industries from
foreign competition in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Under the
various Five-Year Plans,the government hasgranted price incentivesto some
import substitution industries (mostly in producer goods and consumer
durables), including tariff exemptions on imported raw materials and capital
goods, accessto preferential credit, reduced direct tax ratesand accelerated
depreciation allowances. But in most sectors, the only price incentive to
domesticsaleshasbeen the protection potentially afforded by tariffs and im-
port controls which were gradually relaxed after the 1964 devaluation.
Indeed, by making salesto a profitable domestic market depend on satisfac-
21 Theircombinedsharein Korea'smerchandiseexportsdeclinedfrom70.1percent
in1960to 55.6 percentin1975.
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tory export performance, import substituting industriesfrom the beginning
have been encouraged to export.• Until recently, however, import substitu-
tion was a highly selected policy, permitting the concentration of scarce
resources in a few sectors at a time 22 which provided greater opportunity to
exploit scale economies and linkages among closely related production
activities.
In allowing exporters unrestricted accessto imported inputs as well as
exemption from tariffs and indirect taxes, a virtual free trade regime was
accorded export producers, placing them at least on equal footing with com-
petitors in foreign markets. Additionally, explicit subsidieswere provided to
exporters that might even have overcompensated them for any apparent bias
of incentives against exporting (e.g.i due to tariff and import •restrictions that
raise the domestic prices of inputs and import substitutes). This took the
form of direct tax until 1973 and credit subsidies, generous wastage al-
lowances for imported inputs, accelerated depreciation and reduced rates on
public utilities.
As discussed•above, the ASEAN countries have had varying experiences
in the promotion of manufactured exports. With the exception of Singapore
and, to some extent, Malaysia, 'heavy protection of the domestic market,
especially the consumer goods market, had effectively• prevented the full
development of export-oriented industries, the incentive structure tending to
favor domestic sales and giving less encouragement to sales in the •world
market. Promotion of import-substituting industries was less than selective
and did not aim generally to prod newly-established enterprises to export
immediately. This would largely explain the protracted period of import
substitution and wavering commitment to export promotion in the Philip-
pines, Thailand and Indonesia.i
Some of the current efforts at industrial restructuring in the ASEAN
countries are aimed at making incentivesmore favorable to and infrastruc-
ture facilities more supportive of exporting vis-b-vis domestic sales. But it
•remains to be seen whether a virtual free trade regime similar to that en-
joyed by Korean exporters of manufacturedproducts would evolve from
the recent shifts in ASEAN industrial policies.
Turning now to the "other side" of Korean industrial policy, there has
been growing concern in recent years of the declining role of market forces
in the allocation of resourcesamong industries. It has been "subject to
priorities established by the government", resulting in "a lopsided distribu-
tion of limited resourcesin favor of largeenterprisesand heavy and chemical
industries (Economic Planning Board, 1981; p. 8). Policy efforts in the
second half of the 1970s to rapidly deepen the industrial and export struc-
22 After 1960, import-substitutinginvestmentconcentratedfirston fertilizerand
cement,then on petrochemicalderivativesandelectricalproducts,and more recently,
on basicpetrochemicals,ironandsteel,andtransoortequipment.
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ture also contributed to expansionary demahd management and high infla-
tion rates (19.3 percent annual average from 1974 to 1980). While the
evolution of Korea's dynamic comparative advantage warranted a shift to-
ward more capital-and technology-intensive production and exports, it has
been officially acknowledged that the country in recent years moved too
quickly and indiscriminately into heavy industries. More recently, plans for
further heavy industry development have been shelved, postponed 9r modi-
fied. Industrial restructuring away from overly energy.intensive heavy indus-
tries is being undertaken, and "aside from a limited number of large-scale
projects, investment choices will be left to the initiative of the private sec-
tor . . . while the government will play a larger role in social development
and technological and manpower development" (Economic PlanningBoard,
1981 ; pp. 10-11).
The lessonthat this recent Korean industrialization experienceoffers to
ASEAN policymakers is that moving hastily and massively into heavy
industry development could lead even an advanced developing country like
Korea into economic difficulty. This is particularly of contemporary re-
levance to the ASEAN governments, given the apparent enthusiasmat the
present time with the promotion of heavy (basic, major) industries, as dis-
cussed above. It would be very useful for ASEAN industry planners and
policymakers to study carefully not only the recent experience of Korea in
heavy industry development including export marketing, but also those of
India and China which emphasized heavy industries relatively early in their
industrialization processbut are now turning their attention to light indus-
tries, as well as the experiences of some Latin American countries (e.g.,
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia) which had gone heavily into capi-
tal-intensive industrialization and seem to be experiencingdifficulties at this
time.
In conclusion, the important point that should not be missed by
ASEAN policymakers, especially in indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines
where unemployment and underemployment continue to be a major area of
development concern, is that Korea's export-led industrial development
along lines of comparative advantageyielded a high payoff not only in terms
of high income growth rates but also, in view of its labor intensity, rapid
employment growth. Real wages rose significantly in response to labor
market conditions, and this was achieved even without having organized
labor become a powerful interest group. Korea is no longer a labor surplus
economy and, indeed, since the early 1970s, hasbegunto exploit its emerg-
ing comparative advantage in skill-intensive manufactured products. At the
same time, however, import substitution in producer goodsand consumer
durables has taken place, initially on a selectivebasisbut later on, as indica-
ted above, rather extensively and in some casesof heavy industry develop-
ment, prematurely. The latter has been attributed not to the influence of
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market forces but to government priorities. It would be interesting for
policymakersin the ASEAN countries to seehow Korea makesout in itscur-
rent efforts at industrial restructuringostensiblyaimed at increasingthe role
of the market mechanismin the allocation of resourcesamong industries.
V. INDUSTRIAL COMPLIMENTARITY AND TRADE
WITH ASIAN NICS
Given the pro-trade perspectivethat appearsto have been adopted by
the ASEAN countries as part of their development strategies,especially in
view of recent efforts at industrial restructuring, industrial development in
the region will be shaped to a significant extent by the accessto foreign
markets. At the presenttime, there is a great deal of uncertainty on whether
or not the industrialized countries (ICs), currently the primary destination
markets of ASEAN manufactured exports, are prepared to accommodate
the shifts in comparativeadvantagethat are underway.
Since the mid-1970s, ASEAN countries' exports of labor-intensive
manufactures have faced increasing protectionist measures in the OECD
countries. Apart from garments and textiles for which bilateral trade agree-
ments have been negotiated under the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA)
since 1974, exports of footwear, electronic products, processedfood items,
wood productsand handicrafts have been increasinglysubject to a plethora
of import restrictions in the OECD countries.The more common "safeguard
measures" being taken• against ASEAN manufactured products are in the
form of •orderly marketing arrangementsand tariff increasesin the United
Statesand unilateral quantitative restrictions in the EEC and Japan.
The severest case of pr0t:ect-i0nismagainst developing countries has
been pursued under the MFA, especially since the second MFA protocol,
adopted in 1977, which tightened up on imports from low-cost countries._
The third MFA, which wasagreedon in December 1981, represents"another
turn of the protectionist screw." Of particular concernto ASEAN exporters
are the new feature of an "anti-surge mechanism" to limit full utilization of
previously unutilized quotas and further restrictions in useof the flexibility
provisions.
The increasingrestrictivenessof the MFA and of similar trade barriers
relating to other labor-intensivemanufactured goodsmakes it unlikely that
the performance of the so-called newly-industrializing countries (NICs) in
the 1960s could be repeated 15y the ASEAN and other countries in the
second tier of developingeconomies.Among the ASEAN countries, the Phil-
ippines and Thailand seem highly vulnerable, given on-going efforts to pro-
23 Accordingto Wolf (1981), "the renegotiationof the MFA in1977, inwhichthe
EECwasthe leaderbutotherindustrializedcouhtriesoonfollowed,changedtheCharac-
teristicsof theArrangementin fundamentalanddamagingways;"
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mote domestic industry along lines of comparative advantage and declared
reliance on the growth of labor-intensive manufactured exports to contri-
bute substantially to the solution of their employment problem.
The other avenue for increased industrial export growth being pursued
b_ythe ASEAN countries (except Singapore) is in the expansion of exports
of processed primary products. However, as already indicated, there are
questions that can be raised concerning the economic viability and market
prospects of a sudden shift to processed exports. Moreover, the tariff struc-
ture in industrialized countries tends to discriminate against imports of pro-
cessed commodities. Based on the study of Yeats (1979) involving 21 agri-
cultural and mineral products, IC tariffs add only 3 percent to the cost of
imported materials but increase to more than 20 percent along the "proces-
sing chain". These higher rates serve to encourage domestic firms in the
industrialized countries to import raw materials and process them there.
Considering their strong interest in increasing the domestic value added of
primary products exports, ASEAN countries could exert common efforts
toward the elimination of IC tariff distortions of discriminating against
processed exports from primary product producers. Such tariff changes
would facilitate the phasing out of uneconomic processing industries in the
industrialized countries.
Future ASEAN industrial development will be significantly influenced
by the decisions concerning trade and industrial policies to be made not only
in the ICs, which happen to be the region's leading trade partners at the
present time, but also in the NICs. ASEAN success in expanding manu-
factured exports in the medium term is contingent, among other things, on
the continued evolution of the NICs' comparative advantage into more
sophisticated industrial products. The shift in relative factor supplies away
from the abundance of low-wage labor in the NICs requires them to move
on to more skill-and capital-intensive industries. In the process, their con-
tribution to the world market for labor-intensive manufactures will be
reduced and demand for such products will be created in their own mar-
kets. In fact, such countries as Taiwan and Korea have been shifting their
resources toward the production and export of more skill- and capital-
intensive goods since the early 1970s.
In the case of Korea, government planners made public in 1972, and
pursued vigorously thereafter, major shifts in production and exports in
favor of skill and technology intensive products such as machinery, sophis-
ticated electronics_ shipbuilding and chemicals. This redirection in industrial
strategy was prompted by the rapid rise in Korean wage rates, increasing
competition in'.labor-interistivemanufacturedexports from other,develop-
ing countries,and the.risingprotectionism'in developedcountry markets
(Park, 1981). As pointed out, heavy and chemicalindustrieshave been
promotednot only to cater to the domesticmarket but also,andalmost
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from the beginning, to exports, which would justify setting up plants large
enough to exploit scale economies. Under the Five Year Plan 1982-86, the
government is encouraging the further development of the machinery in-
dustry, including parts manufacturing, shipbuilding and the automobile
industry; "the development of industrial electronic machineries such as
semi-conductors, computers, and communications equipment which will
be stressed more than that of consumer electronics;" and finally, the belief
that while "the light manufacturing industry will continue to play the role
of a major export industry during the Plan period, . .. its share in total ex-
ports is expected to decline" (Economic Planning Board, 1981; pp.68-70).
It is expected that the export share of the skill- and capital-intensive indus-
tries such as industrial machinery, finished metal products, electronicsand
shipbuilding and steelproducts will increasesignificantly.24
It should be noted also that the Asian NlCs are relatively poorly en-
dowed with natural resources.This provides additional scope for comple-
mentary production and trade in resource-intensivegoodsbetween them and
the ASEAN countries. As has been pointed out by Akrasanee (1981) how-
ever, industries which are both resource-and technology-intensive have
to be constructed as integrated plants (or "complexes") presentsome diffi-
culties for complementarity. Also, because they are often basic industries,
individual countries may want to develop them, seekingto beself-reliant in
the production of so-called critical products. Harmonization of industrial
plans and trade policies among the ASEAN countries and the Asian NlCs
would be essentialif problems inherent in this field are tobe overcome.
More generally, the relationship between the foreign trade regime
adopted and degreeof accessto the domestic market of the Nits needs to
be investigated. As indicated in Table 9, even in the late 1970s, Korea and
Taiwan were absorbing only a very small proportion of ASEAN manufac-
tured exports.25 By contrast much larger percentages, from 2.8 percent to
as much as 7.4 percent, had gone to Hongkong, which is presumably re-
lated to its open door policy on imports from all sources.A relaxation of
import restraints, especially non-tariff barriers, by the NICs at this time
would not only reduce a source of friction but also "contribute to a more
stable world trading systemby signifying the readinessof the more advanced
developing countries to progressively adhere to the roles and obligations
applying to the more mature trading nations" (Frank, 1981 ).
In Korea, although the averagetariff rate (and also tariff collection asa
percentageof-import value) declined in the 1970s, import controls had been
24 In theaggregate,machineryexportsareprojectedto increasefrom20.9 percent
to 32.6 percentof total 0xportsduringthePlanperiod.
25 In thecaseof Korea,exportsto the ASEANcountriesasa percentageof total
exportsmorethandoubledfrom1971to 1980;bycontrast,theshareof Koreanimports
fromASEANevendecreasedslightly(seeAppendixTable3).
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tightened. In the second half of 1981, the number of restricted import items
as a percentage of the total number of 4-digit CCCN commodities was about
25 percent. During the Fifth Plan Period, imports are to be liberalized such
that the percentage will be lowered "to the level maintained by most indus-
trialized countries by 1986... Tariff reductions will accompany import
liberalization for those commodities not produced in Korea. On the other
hand, temporary tariff increases may be inevitable for some items whose
import is newly liberalized and meet stiff competition with domestic coun-
terparts." (Economic Planning Board, 1981 ; p.44.) Whether ASEAN country
exporters of manufactured products will benefit from this or not remains
to be seen.
The degree to which the NICs are willing to open up their internal
markets will have implications not only on the industrial development
prospects of the ASEAN countries and other "near-NICs" (the second tier
of developing countries) but also on the NICs' own future growth. Thus,
increased accessto such market by the ASEAN countries, viewed in con-
junction with these countries' structural adjustment efforts which could lead
• to expanded NICs' exports to ASEAN, 2e could provide the stimulus neces-
sary to sustain rapid industrial growth in these two developing country
groups which between them have the world's fastest growing national in-
comes. Such a situation may well approximate the conditions which pre-
vailed in the 1950s and 1960s when postwar trade liberalization undertaken
by the ICs not only expanded the market for themselves but also opened
their market to the NICs. It is worth remembering that the opennessof the
IC markets to international comp6tition and the rapid expansion of intra-
industry trade were a critical ingredient in the unprecedented growth of both
IC and NIC economies in that period.
The benefits from the international trading system would of course be
larger if the industrialized countries were to participate in the removal of
import restraints and rationalization of industrial and trade structures. The
gains might even turn out to be largest for the ICs - in terms of lower prices
and increased consumption of labor-intenstive commodities and of higher
growth rates because competition from developing country imports would
speed up the structural adjustment and indeed the growth process in IC
economies (Krueger, 1979). Industrialized countries would also benefit from
the increased exports of manufactured goods that can be expected with the
sustained growth of the NICs and near-NICs. Developing countries are in fact
much larger buyers than sellers of manufactured goods, and the best develOp-
ing country customers of IC products have been those with most raoidlv
26 As pointedout earlier, ASEAN imports havemainly concentratedin producer
goods,especiallycapitalequipment.The fact that Korea'sexport structurehasbeen
shiftingto machineryand equipmentin recentyearswouldseemto imply a potential
forexpandedexportsof suchindustrialproductsto the ASEANcountries.
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growing exports (Fishlow et aL, ] 981 ).27
The final point to make is that; regardlessof how IC governments re-
spond to domestic pressuresfor protectionist action, it would be desirable
and prudent for developingcountries to actively promote trade amongthem-
selves.Within ASEAN, expansion of intraregional trade aswell astrade with
other developingcountries, especially the NICs and other near-NICs, would
confer special dynamic, learning and competitive benefits. The ASEAN
countries, however, should be alert to the likelihood of trade diversion ef-
fects and should seek to minimize them. Expanded trade with other devel-
oping countries should supplement, but not supplant, ASEAN trade with
the industrializedcountries.
27 IC trade balancesin manufacturerswith developingcountriesincreasedfrom
U.S;$15.8 billionin 1963 to $43;7billionin 1973to $132.1billionin 1979.Western
European(EECand EFTA) exportsthe mostmanufacturersto, andenjoysthe largest
absolutesurpluswith, developingcountries(includingor excludingthe oil exporters).
Also,the oll importingdevelopingcountrieswerea largermarketfor Europeanexports
of manufacturersthan japanandNorthAmericantakentogetherin the threeyearscited
above.
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APPENDIX TABLE lc
•THAI LAND: MANU FACTU RED EXPORTS, 1970-1979
(million bahts)
1970 1.973 19761 1979
CannedPineapple 55 75 561 1,244
Garments 18 660 1,535 3,541
Molasses 45 312 498 528
Cement 83 314 378 33
Petroleumproducts 36 379 99 191
Spinning 5 159 337 776
Silk, fabrics 34 39 29 39
Textiles 23 1,027 2,040 4,378
Jute yam, etc. 16 198 430 732
Ganny bags 63 312 116 624
Iron andsteelproducts 41 178 217 684
Householdutensils
of wood 18 135 238 335
Preciousstonesandjewelry 137 641 882 2,753
Others 215 1,084 1,620 3,692
TOTAL 808 5,509 8,977 19,570
SOURCE: World Bank ReportNo. 30679-TH (Demeber23, 1980).
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APPENDIX TABLE 2a
INDONESIA: TEN LARGEST IMPORTS, 1973 and 1979
(million U.S. dollars)
SITC COMMODITY VALUE
1973
732 Road motor vehicles 195.6
719 Machines,n.e.s.,non-electric 192.1
718 Machinesfor specialindustries 103.6
651 Textile yarn and thread 100.6
717 Textile, leather machinery 91.5
042 Rice 83.3
722 Electri power machineryswitchgear 73.0
673 Iron andsteelshapes 71.2
711 Powermachinery, non-electric 66.5
674 Iron, steeluniversals,plate, sheet " 66.3
1979
042 Rice 596.3
719 Machines,me.s, non-electric 493.2
732 Roadmotor vehicles 477.0
331 Crudepetroleum,etc. 443.4
332 Petroleumproducts 349.9
674 Iron, steeluniversals,plate, sheet 299.8
512 Organicchemicals 278.6
581 Plasticmaterials,etc. 236.4
718 Machinesfor specialindustries 232.8
711 Powermachinery,non-electric 225.4
SOURCE: Yearbook of International Trade Statistic_ United Nations (various
issues).
5O
APPENDIX TABLE 2b
MALAYSIA: TEN LARGEST IMPORTS, 1973.and 1977
(million U.S dollars)
SITC COMMODITY VALUE
1973
732 Road motor vehicles 224.9
719 Machines,n.e.s.,non-electric 124.6
718 Machinesfor specialindustries 111.2
042 Rice 85.7
331 Petroleum,crudeandpartly refined 79.7
332 Petroleumproducts 76.9
061 Sugarand honey 69.9
674 Universals,platesandsheetsof iron or steel 69.3
653 Woventextiles,non-cotton 63.8
641 Paperand paperboard 58,0
1977
732 Roadmotorvehicles 408.3
722 Electricpowermachineswitchgear 218.7
719 Machines,n.e.s,non-electric 209.3
718 Machinesfor specialindustries 170.7
724 Telecommunicationsequipment 127_0
729 Electricalmachinery,n.e.s 125.2
674 Universals,platesandsheetsof iron or steel 120.5
641 Paperandpaperboard 84.0
861 Instruments,apparatus 82.2
711 Powermachines,non-electric 81.6
SOURCE: Yearbook of Intern otionN Trode Stotlstlcs, united Nations (various
issues).
51
•APPENDIX TABLE 2.c
PHILIPPINES: TEN LARGEST IMPORTS, 1973 and 1980
(million U.S. dollars)
SITC COMMODITY VALUE
1973
331 Crudepetroleum 209.30
719 Machines,n.e.s, non-electric 139.13
732 Road motor vehicles 102.33
041 Wheat,etc., unmilled 58.79
512 Organicchemicals 56.31
718 Machineryfor specialindustries 56.14
674 Universals,platesand sheetsof ironor steel 54.44
581 Plasticmaterials, etc. 51.25
042 Rice 49.77
711 Non-electricpowermachinery 48.34
1980
331 Petroleum,crudeand partly refined 1929.70
718 Machinesfor specialindustries 395.25
332 Petroleumproducts 373.26
719 Machines,n.¢.S,non-electric 371.30
732 Roadmotor vehicles 295.44
722 Electricpower machinery 208.81
711 Non-electricpower machinery 194.38
512 Organicchemicals 185.09
674 Universals,platesandsheetsof iron 177.07
672 Iron, steelin primary forms 135.11
SOURCE: Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philipoines, 1973 and 1980 (National
Censusand StatisticsOffice).
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APPENDIX TABLE 2d
SINGAPORE: TEN LARGEST IMPORTS, 1973 and 1979
(million U.S.dollars)
SITC COMMODITY VALUE
1973
331 Crude Petroleum 461.5
231 Crude rubber 396.6
729 Electricalmachinery,n.e.s 275.1
719 Non-electricalmachinery,n.e.s. 225.7
653 Woventextiles, non-cotton 217.0
718 Machinery for specialindustries 166.7
732 Road motorvehicles 160.1
724 Telecommunicationsequipment 99.2
735 Shipsand boats 92.9
711 Non-electricpowermachinery 87.6
1979
331 Crudepetroleum 3,824.5
729 Electricalmachinery, n.e.s 1,308.8
231 Cruderubber,syntheticandnatural 928.4
719 Non-electricmachinery,n.e.s. 806.7
332 Petroleumproducts 622.7
734 Aircraft 458.9
724 Telecommunicationsequipment 424.9
732 Road motor vehicles 421.9
718 Machinesfor specialindustries 403.1
653 Woventextiles,non-cotton 372.5
722 Electricpowermachinery, switchgear 337.4
SOURCE: Yearbook of Internationol Trcde Statistic_ United Nations (various
issues).
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APPENDIX TABLE 2e
THAILAND: TEN LARGEST IMPORTS, 1973 and 1978
(million U.S. dollars)
SITC COMMODITY VALUE
1973
732 Roadmotor vehicles 181.9
331 Crudepetroleun,etc. 172.8
719 Machines,n.e.s,non-electric 106.2
674 Universals,sheetsand platesof iron or steel 84.7
717 Textile, leathermachinery 74.9
711 Powermachinery,non-electric 69.7
581 Plasticmaterials,etc. 65.9
263 Cotton 64.7
332 Petroleumproducts 59.2
722 Electricpowermachinery,switchgear 50.7
1978
331 Crudepetroleum 812.8
732 Roadmotor vehicles 421.2
332 Petroleumproducts 305.3
719 Machines,n.e.s,non-electric 293.3
674 Universals,sheet_andplatesof iron or steel 180.8
722 Electricpowermachinery,switchgear 171.1
711 Powermachinery, non-electric 170.5
512 Organicchemicals 150.4
581 Plasticmaterials,etc. 127.8
599 Chemicals,n.e.s 109.4
SOURCE: Yearbooh of International Trade Statistics, United Nations, (various
issues).
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APPENDIX TABLE 3
KOREAN TRADE WITH ASEAN COUNTRIES
(million U.S. dollars)
EXPORTS (fob) IMPORTS (cif)
1971 1980 1971 1980
Indonesia 9 366 41 485
Malaysia 1 184 62 472
Philippines 4 152 44 272
Singapore 10 266 17 161
Thailand 5 165 3 91
ASEAN (A) 29 1,133 166 1,481
Wodd (B) 1,068 17,505 2,394 22,292
A - B (%) 2.7 6.5 6.9 6.6
SOURCE: IMF, Direction of Trade Yearbook 1980 and International Financial
Statistics (May 1981).
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